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CAVEAT LAWYER: THE RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW 
OF LAWYERS' "INVITE TO RELY" STANDARD FOR 
ATTORNEY LIABILITY OF NONCLIENTS 
Sean Pager 
Everybody loves to hate lawyers. Nowadays, it's easier to sue them. The 
erosion of privity barriers has led to a dramatic growth in lawsuits filed 
against attorneys by third-party nonclients} Courts in different jurisdic-
tions have sanctioned such claims under variant theories of negligence and 
third-party beneficiary doctrines.2 Specific rationales relied on by courts 
and commentators include a "balance of factors" test,3 gratuitous under-
taking or reliance, negligent misrepresentation,4 professional negligence 
(malpractice), and fiduciary duties.s Courts have generally been careful, 
however, to circumscribe the resulting exposure that attorneys face under 
any of these theories.6 One reason has been a fear of "indeterminate lia-
1. See Jay Feinman, Attorney Liability to N01/Clients, 31 TORT & INS. LJ. 735 (1996) (stating 
that attorneys have become a preferred target for such economic negligence cases brought 
by third parties). 
2. See 1 RONALD MALLEN & JEFFREY SMITH: LEGAL MALPRACTICE (3d ed. 1989), sec. 7.11-
12 [hereinafter MALPRACTICE]; id. at 739-46. For a compilation of recent cases nationwide 
see Joan Teshima, Annotation, What Constitutes Negligence Sufficient to Render Attorney Liable 
to Persrm Other Than Immediate Client (Supp. Sept. 1996); 61 A.L.R. 4th 464, Attorney's Lia-
bility, to One Other Than Immediate Client, for Negligence in Crmnectirm with Legal Duties, 61 
A.L.R. 4th 615 (Supp. Sept. 1996). 
3. The balance of factors approach has its origins in a California case, Biakanja v. Irving, 
49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958). The factors to determine whether a duty is owed include 
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, (2) the foreseeability 
of harm, (3) certainty of injury, (4) proximity of causation, (5) the policy of preventing future 
harm, (6) the extent to which recognizing a duty for attorneys would impose undue burden 
on the profession. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 87,15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961). 
4. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 740-46. 
5. See John Sutton,Jr., The Lawyer's Fiduciary Liabilities to Third Parties, 37 S. TEX. L. REv. 
1033 (1996). 
6. See Douglas Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Nrmclient Parties-At What Cost?, 23 
COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 1, 15 (1989). 
Sean Pager received his J.D. degree in 1998 from Boalt Hall School of Low, University 
of California at Berkeley. 
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bility" famously described by then-Judge Cardozo in Ultramares v. Touche.7 
This concern assumes added weight when one considers the special nature 
of the attorney-client relationship. Creating duties to third parties could 
detract from the attorney's proper focus on the client.8 As such, normal 
liability principles "must yield to the higher priority given to the lawyer's 
duties to the client of loyalty and zealous representation, and to mainte-
nance of confidentiality, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and open access 
to COUrts."9 
This pattern of judicial restraint in the realm of third-party liability for 
attorneys, however, is threatened by the expansive language of the forth-
coming Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. lO \Vhile pur-
porting merely to restate and codify existing case law-as befits such a 
widely relied-on authority-this Restatement makes a number of subde de-
partures. Drafted primarily by academics, the document follows the path 
of previous Restatements that have blended consensus with reform, attempt-
ing in discrete nudges to move the state of American law forward in chosen 
directions. I I 
The sections of the Restatement that govern lawyer liability to third par-
ties provide a case in pointY Of particular concern is section 73, which 
establishes duties of care that lawyers owe to certain nonclients at the risk 
of malpractice. 13 Each of the section's four parts codifies a different theo-
retical basis for finding such a duty of care. Although most of these sections 
track existing case law in narrowly defining the context in which these 
duties apply, part two of section 73 stands out as an exception. It establishes 
an expansive composite duty using untested and potentially ambiguous lan-
guage.14 This article will argue that part two of section 73, in fact, repre-
sents a calculated departure from existing case law. Grounded in academic 
7. See Ultramares Corp v. Touche, Niven & Co., 225 N.Y. 170,79, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). 
8. See id.j Cifu, supra note 6, at 15. 
9. LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (ABAlBNA) 301:602, Mar. 28, 1990, 
p.57. 
10. Although this is the first Restatement to cover this topic, the American Law Institute 
has designated it "Third" in keeping with the overall Restatement series now in its third 
revision. Unless otherwise specified, all future cites to the Restatement will refer to the Re-
statement of the Law Governing Lawyers (fentative Draft No.8, March 21, 1997). 
11. See Charles Silver & Michael Quinn, Are Liability Carriers Second-Class Clients? No, But 
They May be Soon-A Call to Arms Against the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, 
6 No.2 COVERAGE 21 (1996). 
12. See generally RESTATEMENT, ch. 4 (governing "Lawyer Civil Liability"). 
13. Comment a to section 73 notes that lawyers can incur liabilities to nonclients for 
grounds other than malpractice. For example, section 77 states that a lawyer owes additional 
duties of care to nonclients "when a nonlawyer would in similar circumstances." Other sources 
of liability include litigation sanctions, security legislation, and "acting without authority." 
This article only addresses liability under section 73. 
14. See Sutton, supra note 4, at 1059 n.l03 (describing language of section 73(2) as "too 
squishy to be of much aid"). 
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theory instead of precedent, its provisions can be defended neither on posi-
tive nor normative grounds. 
I. ONE OF THESE THINGS IS NOT LIKE THE OTHER: 
PART TWO IS OVERBROAD 
Even a cursory reading of section 73 reveals a contrast between the broad 
language of part two and the other, more circumscribed, provisions of the 
section. IS To begin with, the latter uniformly require actual knowledge by 
the lawyer of the circumstances giving rise to the duty.16 By contrast, under 
part two, an attorney can incur liability merely by being deemed to have 
"invite[d]" reliance on his opinion or provision of servicesY As will be 
argued below, the use of the term "invite" does not necessarily assume 
actual knowledge. IS 
Furthermore, the other parts of section 73 all contemplate the duty at-
taching to a specific nonclient who is identifiable at the time the duty 
15. Section 73 provides as follows: 
For the purposes of liability under section 71, a lawyer owes a duty to use care within the 
meaning of section 74: 
(1) to a prospective client, as stated in section 27; 
(2) to a nonclient when and to the extent that: 
(a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites the nonclient 
to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal services, and the nonclient so 
relies, and 
(b) the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer to be 
entitled protection; 
(3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that: 
(a) the lawyer knows that the client intends as one of the primary objectives of the 
representation that the lawyer's services benefit the nonclient; and 
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer'S performance of obligations to 
the client, and the absence of such a duty would make enforcement of those obligations 
unlikely; 
(4) to a nonclient when and to the extent that: 
(a) the lawyer's client is a trustee, guardian, executor, or fiduciary acting primarily to 
perform similar functions for the nonclient; 
(b) circumstances known to the lawyer make it clear that appropriate action by the lawyer 
is necessary with respect to a matter within the scope of the representation to prevent 
or rectifY a breach or fiduciary duty owed by the client to the nonclient, where (i) the 
breach is a crime or fraud or (ii) the lawyer has assisted or is assisting the breach; 
(c) the nonclient is not reasonably able to protect its rights; and 
(d) such a duty would not significantly impair the lawyer's performance of obligations to 
the client; and 
(5) to a nonclient [whom the lawyer knows to be in imminent bodily danger from a client]. 
16. See id. Parts three, four, and five expressly state that actual knowledge is required. See 
id. Part one pertains to prospective clients. It cross-references section 27, whose terms im-
plicitly ensure actual knowledge in that the duty owed derives from the attorney's direct 
interactions with the prospective client in question. See id. at 1; sec. 27. 
17. [d. at 2(a). 
18. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
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issues. 19 Yet, part two offers no such assurances on its face. The class of 
potential nonclients is curtailed only by a generic reference to "re-
mote[ness]" determined by "applicable tort law."20 
In addition, most of the other parts incorporate an element of necessity 
to limit their scope of application. Part 3(b) applies only where necessary 
to enforce client interests j21 part 4(b) has the proviso that the "nonclient 
[be] not reasonably able to protect its rights";22 and part five stipulates the 
nonclient be "unaware of the risk."23 By contrast, part two operates on far 
more open-ended terms. It requires only that reliance be invited in any 
form and subsequently ensue for any reason, regardless of context.24 
Finally, and crucially, the other parts have language designed to minimize 
conflicts with legitimate client interests.2s Parts three and four expressly 
restrict their applicability to situations where "such a duty would not sig-
nificantly impair the performance of the lawyer's obligation to the client."26 
Part 3(b) further limits its effect to cases in which "the absence of such a 
duty would make the enforcement of ... obligations [to the client] un-
likely."27 Part two is alarmingly devoid of such language of limitation. This 
omission raises the potential for conflicts with the paramount duty that the 
lawyer owes to her client. Indeed, applying the principle of expressio unius, 
one might conclude that such conflicting duties are impliedly sanctioned. 
This lack of substantive limitations in part two becomes even more glar-
ing when one considers that the policy interest in averting potential con-
flicts with the client would seem to weigh in favor of placing greater safe-
guards on the open-ended reliance-based duty that is envisioned. "Whereas 
the interests of beneficiary-plaintiffs in parts three and four, for example, 
can normallt8 be assumed to coincide with those of the client proper, the 
19. Part five explicitly requires an identifiable victim. Part one concerns a prospective client 
with whom the lawyer has direct dealings. Finally, parts three and four pertain to third-party 
beneficiaries who stand in a specific relationship to the client. See RESTATEMENT sec. 73. As 
such, there is not likely to be much doubt as to the identities of nonclients who could claim 
a duty under any any of these provisions, and in most cases one would expect the set of 
suspects to be limited to a single individual. 
20. [d. at 2(b). 
21. See id. at 3(b). 
22. [d. at 4(b). 
23. [d. at 5. 
24. See id. at 2. 
25. The exception is part one that deals with prospective clients. In this case, there is no 
built-in triangular relationship between attorney, client, and nonclient; thus the conflict does 
not arise. 
26. [d. at 3(b), 4(d). Part five does put the attorney in opposition to the client, but only in 
cases where the client threatens to cause imminent bodily harm through criminal conduct, 
which is hardly a legitimate interest worth protecting. See id. at 5. 
27. [d. at 3(b). 
28. Admittedly, part four pertains to situations where client interests do appear to stand 
diametrically opposed to those of the beneficiary. However, this situation arises only because 
the client is breaching her duties as a fiduciary. When one conceives of the attorney's duties 
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duty in part two issues to a much wider set of claimants with potentially 
divergent interests. The inevitable conflicts that will result constitute the 
core objection to part two that this article advances. 
II. PART TWO CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH EXISTING CASE LAW 
The reliance-based duty described in part two of the Restatement in fact 
represents a consolidation of several distinct lines of cases under a new 
composite duty. It holds an attorney accountable for malpractice liability 
to a nonclient when and to the extent that: 
(a) the lawyer or (with the lawyer's acquiescence) the lawyer's client invites 
the nonclient to rely on the lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal ser-
vices, and the nonclient so relies, and 
(b) the nonclient is not, under applicable tort law, too remote from the lawyer 
to be entitled protection.29 
This one-size-fits-all formulation may have intuitive appeal; yet, the result 
is a duty whose scope exceeds the sum of its parts. lO Moreover, even mea-
sured against any single line of cases, the Restatement arguably takes a 
broader view than that warranted by existing precedents. 
A. Opinions 
Cases addressing attorney liability for legal opinions on which third parties 
have detrimentally relied demonstrate a variety of analytic approaches. As 
with all third-party liability cases, a threshold issue is the barrier posed by 
the absence of privity of contract. Some courts reason that privity flows 
from the act of offering an opinion on which another relies.l1 Others con-
clude that such action creates liability independent of privity.l2 Some ju-
risdictions categorize the breach of the duty that results as legal malprac-
tice;ll some label it a breach of fiduciary duty;l4 while others rely on the 
as being properly owed to the fiduciary in functional terms derived from the office and not 
to tbe occupant personally, the conflict becomes resolved. See Feinman, supra note 1, at 
764-65. 
29. RESTATEMENT sec. 73(2). 
30. See infra notes 70-71, 87-96, 102-11 and accompanying text. 
31. See, e.g., Trust Co. of Louisiana v. N.N.P.lnc., 104F.3d 1478,88 (5th Cir. 1997)(privity 
created by rendering of opinion to third party); Crossland Savings FSB v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 
700 F. Supp. 1274, 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (by furnishing opinion to third party, lawyer "en-
gages in a form of limited representation"). 
32. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 1l0, 
128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976) (balance of factors reveals duty despite absence of privity); Security 
Nat'l Bank v. Lish, 311 A.2d 833, 35 (D.c. App. Ct. 1973) (duty exists notwitbstanding lack 
of privity). 
33. See, e.g., Courtneyv. Waring, 191 Cal. App. 3d 1434,43,237 Cal. Rptr. 233, 38 (1987). 
34. See, e.g., Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 NJ. 472, 80, 655 A.2d 1354, 58 (1995); Alpert v. 
Shea Gould Climenko & Casey, 1988 WL 90922,2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (unpublished decision). 
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common-law tort of negligent misrepresentation.35 However, courts are 
almost unanimous in limiting liability to cases in which attorneys offered 
an opinion for the specific purpose of inducing reliance in a targeted third-
party audience, or else knew that their client had such intent.36 Moreover, 
decisions frequently emphasize that in directing the opinion towards the 
third party, the attorney must have acted on behalf of her client.37 In this 
way, courts ensure that, as in the case of third-party beneficiaries, attorney 
obligations remain properly aligned with client interests.38 Indeed, some 
courts even analyze opinion liability under the rubric of third-party ben-
eficiary analysis. 39 By contrast, the Restatement offers no such assurances in 
its text and accompanying comments. 
1. The Black Letter 
The wording of section 73(2) requires only that the lawyer "invit[e] the 
nonclient to rely .... "40 Neither the text nor the comments that accompany 
section 73 define what it means to invite reliance. Moreover, the dictionary 
definition of "invite" yields an ambiguity. Invite can either mean (a) "to 
offer an incentive or inducement to: entice" or (b) "to provide opportunity 
of occasion: increase the likelihood of: open the way to."41 The first of 
these meanings parallels the "intend to induce" formulations cited in the 
case law above. However, the second seems broader, in that it arguably 
eliminates any requirement of intent. Just as a woman might be said to 
35. See, e.g., Mehaffy, Rider, Wmdholz & Wilson v. Central Bank Denver, N.A., 892 P.2d 
230,236 (Colo. 1995). 
36. Many courts cite sec. 552 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts in this regard that restricts 
liability only to "a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance [the opinion 
provider] intends to supply the information ... [and whose] reliance upon it in a transaction 
that he intends the information to influence." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, sec. 552(2). 
See, e.g., Mehaffy, 892 P.2d at 236 (adopting Restatement of Torts). Other courts arrive at similar 
formulations based on local authorities. See, e.g., Courtney at 1444 (attorney knowledge that 
purpose of work product was to influence plaintiff's conduct is necessary prerequisite to es-
tablish duty in California case law). Arkansas has codified the "intent to influence" standard 
of duty by statute. See ARK. CODE fum. § 16-22-310 (Westlaw 1995). 
37. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560,63 (7th Cir. 1987) (under lliinois law, 
plaintiff must prove purpose of attorney-client relationship itself was to benefit or influence 
the third party); Burger v. Pond, 224 Cal. App. 3d 597, 605, 273 Cal. Rptt. 709, 15 (1990) 
(intended influence must be an objective of service attorney was retained to perform); see also 
MALPRACTICE sec. 7.11, p. 387. 
38. See Crossland, 700 F. Supp. at 1283 (describing how the risk of conflicting interests at 
all levels is minimized by assurance that client authorized that opinion be addressed to third 
party on client's behalf); if. United Bank of Kuwait v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil Re-
covery Associates, 755 F. Supp. 1195, 1203 -04 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (liability denied for attorney 
misrepresentations made without client approval). 
39. See Trust Co., 104 F.3d at 1487-88 (describing duty arising where attorney contracts 
to provide opinion for the benefit of a third person). 
40. See RESTATEMENT sec. 73(2)(a). 
41. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1190 (1993). A separate definition of invite 
concerns its formal meaning as applied specifically to social contexts, i.e., to invite someone 
to a cocktail party. See id. 
HeinOnline -- 34 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1127 1998-1999
Attorney Liability to Nonclients 1127 
"invite" unwanted advances by dressing provocatively, a lawyer might be 
deemed to invite reliance without intending to, merely by acting in a way 
that made such reliance foreseeable.42 
At best, such ambiguity is troubling. This article will henceforth consider 
the scenario under which invite is understood according to its broader, 
intent-neutral meaning. As will be discussed shortly, there is evidence that 
courts are already reading section 73 in this light, fashioning a novel "fore-
seeable reliance" standard.43 This interpretation represents a clear depar-
ture from existing law in most jurisdictions that reject foreseeability alone 
as a basis for imposing liability on attorneys to third parties.44 
None of the illustrative cases cited in the reporter's note following sec-
tion 73 support such a broad imposition of liability.45 The only authorities 
to the contrary are found in Mississippi and New Jersey case law. Missis-
sippi relied on statutory authority to reach its result.46 In the case of New 
Jersey, the supreme court's adoption of a foreseeability standard as to re-
liance was itself based in part on the draft RestatementY Neither case offers 
a compelling rationale to justify a broad reading of section 73. 
In the Mississippi case, Century 21, a homeowner had sued an attorney 
on whose negligently prepared title opinion he had relied. Although the 
plaintiff had not been the lawyer's client, the Mississippi Supreme Court 
overruled previous cases barring such malpractice claims based on a 1990 
statute abolishing the necessity of privity "in all causes of action for ... 
economic loss brought on account of negligence."48 The court determined 
that without a privity requirement, "the absence of an attorney-client 
relationship is merely one factor to consider in determining the duty 
owed .... "49 Analogizing a title opinion to an auditor's report, the court 
concluded that a duty of care should be owed all foreseeable users who 
would rely on such work product to meet minimal professional standards. 
In extending malpractice liability to embrace such duty, however, the court 
carefully limited its holding to "attorneyD negligence in performing title 
work."50 
42. In addition, the meaning of "rely" can itself be taken to extremes. See Ellen Eisenberg, 
Attorney's Negligence and Third Parties, 57 N.Y.D. L. REv. 126, 160-61 (1982) (suggesting that 
a baby boy would have a reliance claim against his would-be parents' attorney for negligently 
processing adoption papers). Moving the standard from intended to foreseeable reliance 
would seem to encourage a broader construction to be placed on the root term by loosening 
the ties between cause and effect. 
43. See infra notes 51, 58-64 and accompanying text. 
44. See MALPRACTICE sec. 7.11-.12; accord Burger, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 606. 
45. See cases cited in RESTATEMENT sec. 73, Reporter's Note, cmt. e. 
46. See Century 21 Deep South Properties, Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 373 (1992). 
47. See Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 139 N.). 472, 483-84, 655 A.2d 1354 (1995) (citing Re-
statement approvingly). 
48. See id. (citing MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-17-20 (Supp. 1990». 
49.Id. 
50. Id. at 374. 
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Such a limited departure from the majority rule hardly countenances the 
wholesale expansion ofliability embodied in the Restatement. Title opinions 
are objective, technical documents. The duty of care required to prepare 
them in a nonnegligent fashion is the same whether owed to a third party 
or to the actual client. 51 Thus, allowing expanded liability in such a case 
does not introduce any possibility of conflicting duties for the attorney. By 
contrast, the Restatement goes well beyond the objective context of title 
opinions to create liability for any form of opinion on which a nonclient 
might rely. In these wider contexts, the neat analogy of lawyering to ac-
countancy breaks down, and the possibility of conflicting interests cannot 
be avoided. 
The Petrillo decision in New Jersey illustrates the dangers in applying a 
foreseeable reliance standard derived from a broad reading of the Restate-
ment to a more ambiguous fact pattern.52 In Petrillo, an attorney repre-
senting the seller of real property sent the seller's Realtor excerpts from a 
soil engineering report. The excerpts indicated that the property had 
yielded two successful soil percolation tests, the minimum required by local 
authorities for a septic system. However, because only selected pages were 
excerpted from the original engineering studies, they gave the impression 
that there had been a total of seven tests, two successful, when in fact thirty 
had been performed (with twenty-eight failing). The excerpted report sub-
sequently became part of the Realtor's sales packet. 53 
Meanwhile, the Realtor acquired the property directly and sold it to a 
third party. The same lawyer represented the Realtor in that transaction. 
A dispute arose after the sale and the third party named the lawyer in her 
lawsuit against the Realtor, based on the lawyer's alleged negligence in 
compiling a misleading summary of the soil tests.54 The trial court dis-
missed the complaint against the lawyer for failure to state a claim. The 
appellate division reversed, and the supreme court affirmed. 55 
In holding that the attorney could owe a duty to the third-party buyer 
under these facts, the supreme court developed the notion of documents 
having an "objective purpose," such as the title report in the Mississippi 
case. It then reasoned that this purpose "and the extent to which others 
foreseeably may rely on [the document], determines the scope of a lawyer's 
duty in preparing such documents."56 However, while the notion of an 
51. This observation only holds for the technical aspects of the report. To the extent that 
such reports contain peripheral content that might mislead third parties independent of their 
intended recipient, the logic for extending a duty fails. 
5 2. As noted, the Petrillo opinion explicidy relied on section 73 of the Restatement as an 
authority for its foreseeable reliance standard. See 139 N.]. at 483-84. 
53. See id. at 475. 
54. See id. at 475-77. 
55. See id. at 474,477-78. 
56. 139 N.]. at 485. 
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objective purpose makes sense in the context of a title report whose purpose 
is uncontroversial and universally applicable, it makes less sense under the 
facts of Petrillo where the attorney's purpose in sending the Realtor the 
excerpted report is subject to question. 57 
Regrettably, the court dismissed such objections as irrelevant. It argued 
that "[a]lthough [the lawyer] might have intended only that the [excerpted] 
report would demonstrate only that the property had passed two percola-
tion tests, his subjective intent may not define the objective meaning of the 
report."58 The mere fact that the attorney "knew, or should have known, that 
[the Realtor] might deliver it to a prospective purchaser" was sufficient to 
create a duty of care, a duty determined according to the "objective" ex-
pectations of those purchasers who would foreseeably rely on its contents. 59 
This analysis represents a perversion of the rationale of Century 21 and 
a dangerous departure from the principles of established case law. Unlike 
the title report scenario where the very nature of the document admits no 
possibility of a distinct subjective purpose, here objective purpose is deter-
mined by a retroactive appraisal of the circumstances in total disregard of 
subjective intent. Since an attorney can only guess at what this appraisal 
might be in the light of subsequent events, such an approach opens the 
possibility for an attorney to be blindsided by lawsuits filed by third-party 
plaintiffs. 
There are some grounds for dismissing the alarming language used in 
Petrillo as dicta. Because the case reviewed a preverdict dismissal of claims, 
the court was construing evidence in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff.60 In a later passage of the decision, the court seems to return to an 
"intent to induce" standard in describing the evidence as permitting "the 
inference that the objective purpose of the report was to induce a pro-
spective purchaser" and stating that the attorney's subsequent "involve-
ment supports the further inference that [the attorney] knew that [his cli-
ent] intended to use the report for that purpose."61 If so, then Petrillo might 
not support a reading of the Restatement in which intent is not required. 
Such an optimistic reading seems betrayed, however, by the court's explicit 
57. By contrast, the only other New Jersey case to employ this rationale of objective pur-
pose involved a public offering statement whose content was regulated by state starute. See 
Atlantic Paradise Assoc. v. Perskie, Nehman & Zelmer, 284 N.J. Super. 678, 666 A.2d 211 
(1995). Indeed, although the Atlantic court based its analysis on the foreseeable reliance ra-
tionale of Petrillo, see id. at 684-85, it could just as easily have found liability based on an 
implied duty of care read out of the starute itself. 
58. Id. at 486 (emphasis added). 
59. See id. at 486-87 (emphasis added). 
60. See id. at 478. 
61. Id. at 486-87. Note that under this rationale, the attorney seems liable for knowingly 
acquiescing in the client's intended inducement instead of directly inviting reliance himself. 
See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
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endorsement of foreseeable reliance as the governing standard in New 
Jersey.62 
Yet, one might ask what harm is done by imposing liability in such cases. 
To be sure, attorneys may not always anticipate reliance by nonclients in 
executing their duties. Yet, so long as they perform these duties in a non-
negligent fashion, why should they worry? After all, the Petrillo court rea-
soned, the attorney there could easily have avoided liability by sending the 
complete report or clarifying the omissions it contained.63 "Why should not 
the attorney pay the price for the loss suffered from his misleading work 
product? The answer depends on why the document is misleading. If, as 
in Petrillo, the deficiencies are determined solely with respect to some pu-
tative "objective" purpose based on a foreseeable audience of nonclients, 
this may conflict with the immediate needs of the client on whose behalf 
the attorney presumably acts. This may not have been the case in Petrillo 
itself.64 Yet, one can easily envision alternate fact patterns in which such 
conflicts become acute. 
Suppose, for example, that instead of soil percolation tests, an attorney's 
report details something of a confidential nature, e.g., financial data. Op-
erating on a "need-to-know" basis, the attorney divulges as much infor-
mation as necessary to serve the client's purpose. "Why should the attorney 
be forced to breach confidentiality and divulge additional information to 
guard against the contingency that some foreseeable, but unintended, 
reader of the report might be subsequently misled? Note that the merits 
of the case differ under the erstwhile intent to induce standard. If a client-
acting through his attorney-intends to influence a specific audience by 
selective dissemination of information, then fairness demands that this be 
done in a way that does not mislead. 
The expansion of liability wrought by the Restatement is not confined to 
its use of "invite" instead of "intend." Under the broad duty recognized by 
part two, an attorney need not even invite reliance directly, but merely 
"acquiesc[e]" in an invitation issued by the client.65 Like invite, acquies-
cence is nowhere defined in the Restatement text or comments. However, 
the dictionary meaning of "acquiesce" is "to accept ... tacitly. "66 Although 
tacit acceptance might presuppose actual knowledge, the acceptance in 
62. The court's precise formulation of this standard is that "the lawyer know, or should 
know, of [the nonclient's] reliance." See 139 N.J. at 484. 
63. See id. at 487. 
64. The scant facts provided in the opinion make such an assessment tenuous. There is at 
least the hint of a potential conflict. At a later stage, the original seller deliberately withheld 
the complete reports from the Realtor, pending negotiations over reimbursement of the en-
gineering consulting fees. See id. at 476. The attorney's duty of loyalty to his original client 
would presumably have precluded his transferring the reports at that stage. 
65. See RESTATEMENT sec. 73(2)(a). 
66. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 18. 
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question plainly refers only to the circumstances that constitute the client's 
invitation, and does not necessarily imply knowledge of the actual reliance 
that follows. All the lawyer has to do is acquiesce in client conduct that 
makes such reliance "foreseeable."67 
Making matters worse, comment e, which accompanies the text of sec-
tion 73 and addresses reliance under part two, states that "[a] lawyer's 
acquiescence in use of the lawyer's opinion may be manifested either before 
or after the lawyer renders it."68 Permitting acquiescence to be manifested 
after the fact clearly envisions that third-party usage need not have been 
foreseeable at the time the lawyer rendered the opinion. As such, lawyers 
appear to have a duty to monitor affirmatively the content and dissemi-
nation of all prior opinions with a view to averting detrimental reliance by 
unknown and previously unanticipated third parties whenever circum-
stances could indicate the lawyer has "acquiesced," thus permitting such 
reliance to become foreseeable. Such a burden carries the standard of lia-
bility expressed in part two to new extremes. 
Petrillo again serves as a cautionary example. In addition to faulting the 
attorney for failing to foresee that his report might mislead a prospective 
purchaser at the time he sent it, the court seems to hedge its bets by placing 
great emphasis on the lawyer's continued involvement with the eventual 
sale.69 The court notes that the eventual purchaser-plaintiff had expressed 
"concern about percolation,"7o the implication presumably being that this 
concern should have prompted the attorney to reflect back to the report 
he had sent eight months earlier and reevaluate it in light of this concern. 
In fact, the excerpted report may well have been but part of a pile of records 
that the lawyer transferred to the Realtor. The attorney had no knowledge 
that the Realtor had included the report in materials given to the plaintiff.71 
Yet, with the benefit of twenty-twenty hindsight, the court now suggests 
that his continued involvement in the sale constituted a form of acquies-
cence to the detrimental reliance that allegedly ensued. Plainly, acquies-
cence, like foreseeability, lies in the eyes of the beholder. 
Another way in which the Restatement formulation departs from existing 
law pertains to the enforcement of the duty of care that it establishes. Even 
though a lawyer issues an opinion under circumstances that could give rise 
to a duty, not every third party who comes along has a claim on that duty. 
Many courts take a narrow view, requiring actual knowledge by the lawyer 
that a particular individual is relying on her opinion to trigger a duty to 
67. Since the acquiescence pertains to the client's invitation to rely, this implicates the same 
foreseeable reliance standard, once removed. 
68. See id. at cmt. e (emphasis added). 
69. 139 N.J. at 486-87. 
70. [d. at 487-88. 
71. See id. at 494 (Garibaldi,]., dissenting) (quoting finding to that effect by the trial judge). 
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that third party.72 The main exception are jurisdictions employing Cali-
fornia's "balance of factors" approach that eschew such categorical 
requirements.73 
The Restatement purportedly accounts for this variation by restricting 
recovery to nonclients who are not "under applicable tort law, too remote 
from the lawyer to be entitled to protection."74 Here too, this generic lim-
itation fails to take into account the special duties that attorneys owe their 
clients, by making remoteness the touchstone of third-party obligation and 
ignoring the possibility of adverse interests,75 By contrast, even the com-
paratively liberal California approach balances foreseeability of harm 
against the countervailing risk of conflicts of interest,76 And other jurisdic-
tions impose an absolute bar on enforcing third-party liability where con-
flict issues might arise,77 
In this respect, the Mississippi decision in Century 21 can be partially 
reconciled with the established California approach that allows for liability 
where "the foreseeability of harm to the third party ... is not outweighed 
by other policy considerations."78 In the case of title reports, where there 
is no possibility of conflicting interests, such policy considerations do not 
intrude. Under the Restatement's more general formulation, however, there 
are no such assurances. 
2. The Comments 
The broad language used in part two is only partly mitigated by the com-
ments that accompany its text. Many of these comments appear to narrow 
72. See, e.g., Crossland, 80 N.Y.2d at 384; Trost Co., 104 F.3d at 1487; Austin v. Bradley, 
Barry & Parlow, P.e., 836 F. Supp. 36, 38,41 (D. Mass. 1993). 
73. See MALPRACTICE sec. 7.11 
74. RESTATEMENT sec. 73(2)(b). Remoteness in some jurisdictions is itself detennined by a 
foreseeability standard. The Petrillo court seems to have confused the two usages of foresee-
ability in its reliance upon Massachusetts authority to support its position. It cited language 
from Norman v. Brown, Todd & Heyburn, 693 F. Supp. 1259, 1265 (D. Mass. 1988), suggesting 
a foreseeability standard was applied in that case to determine if a duty was owed. See l39 
N.). at 482. However, foreseeability in Massachusetts instead serves as a limit of proximate 
causation and thus goes to the enforcement of an already detennined duty. The ambiguous 
language taken from Norman originally carne from Capitol Indemnity Corp. v. Freedom House 
Development Corp., 487 F. Supp. 839, 842 (1980), which makes the issue plain. To first create 
a duty, however, Massachusetts requires the attorney have actual knowledge of the nonclient's 
reliance as Norman itself acknowledges. 639 F. Supp. at 1259. 
75. Professor John Leubsdorf, the associate reporter for the Restatement and principal au-
thor of chapter 4 (which contains section 73), explained this provision at the recent ALI 
proceedings as "an issue of general tort law, not limited to legal malpractice .... The rule 
should be the same for lawyers as it is for accountants." See Proceedings of the 74th Annual 
Meeting of the American Law Institute, p. 311 (1998). As already discussed, this equation of 
lawyers with accountants ignores the special duties that attorneys alone owe to their clients. 
76. See supra note 3. 
77. See Lamare v. Basbanes, 418 Mass. 274, 76,636 N.E.2d 218 (1994); United Bank of 
Kuwait v. Enventure Energy Enhanced Oil Recovery Associates, 755 F. Supp. 1195, 1203-
04 (S.D.N.¥. 1989). 
78. St. Paul Title Co. v. Meier, 181 Cal. App. 3d 948, 951, 226 Cal. Rptr. 538, 539 (1986). 
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the scope of meaning of the text; yet on closer inspection, their wording 
proves less than airtight. For example, on the conflict of interest issue 
discussed above, comment e only states that a "lawyer's client typically bene-
fits from the nonclient's reliance [on opinions] ... and recognition of such 
a claim does not conflict with duties the lawyer properly owed to the cli-
ent."79 Such a general observation followed by a conclusory assertion is 
hardly reassuring. Instead, an adequate alignment of interests should be 
made a formal prerequisite to sanctioning extracurricular obligations.8o As 
noted above, many jurisdictions do so by stipulating that duties to third 
parties can only arise when the lawyer is acting on the client's behalf.81 
Comment b, which lays out the rationale underpinning the entire sec-
tion, does acknowledge that imposing liability to nonclients "could tend to 
discourage lawyers from vigorous representation."82 Yet, again, such a gen-
eralized statement of concern is no substitute for specific doctrinal protec-
tions built into the black letter law. 
Another apparent discrepancy between the comments and text concerns 
the nature of the duty that arises under part two. The introductory text 
governing section 73 as a whole refers to "a duty to use care within the 
meaning of section 74."83 The duties invoked in section 74 are those of 
diligence and competence.84 VV'hat does this mean for opinions given to 
third parties?85 
Comment e tells us that "the cause of action ordinarily is in substance 
identical to a claim for negligent misrepresentation."86 This comment 
would be a lot more helpful, however, without the qualifier "ordinarily. "87 
It is possible to envision malpractice claims under part two based on opin-
ions that go beyond simple allegations of misrepresentation. If the duty of 
79. See RESTATEMENT sec. 73, cmt. e. (emphasis added). 
80. Another section of the Restatement regulating evaluations undertaken for use by third 
parties does require that the lawyer keep client interests foremost and "obtain consent after 
consultation." RESTATEMENT sec. 152. Yet, section 152 merely supplies a rule of professional 
guidance without consequence in determining liability under section 73. 
81. See supra notes 38, 39 and accompanying text. 
82. RESTATEMENT sec. 73, ernt. b. The comment also suggests that this concern be kept in 
view when applying section 73. See id. 
83. RESTATEMENT sec. 73. 
84. See id. at sec. 74(1). 
85. This issue was raised during the recent ALI proceedings; therefore, it is possible further 
changes may be forthcoming to clarilY the matter. See Proceedings of the 74th Annual Meet-
ing of the American Law Institute, p. 329 (1998). 
86. Id. at sec. 73, cmt. e (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, secs. 552-54). 
87. The comment also states that "the duty of a lawyer providing an opinion is ordinarily 
limited to using care to avoid making or adopting misrepresentations, and does not re-
quire the lawyer to use care in preventing misrepresentations by others even in docu-
ments that the lawyer has helped to draft." !d. This still leaves open the (nonordinary) pos-
sibility that a lawyer might incur liability for failing to use care in ways that do not involve 
misrepresentation. 
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care under section 74 is read broadly, an attorney, in framing her opinion, 
might become obligated to consider, diligently and competently, the wider 
interests of any third parties whose reliance he or she might be inviting. 
Failure to use care in tailoring such an opinion to suit the needs of this 
audience might thus incur liability, even without the opinion being factually 
misleading. 
There is some indication that such a broad, indeed virtually untenable, 
duty was not intended under part two. As comment e proceeds to discuss 
specific disclosure and due diligence requirements to avoid making mis-
representations, it cross-references comment c of section 152 for more 
particulars.ss Comment c explores a lawyer's duty to third parties within 
the context of a formal evaluation, akin to an opinion letter. Here we learn 
that a lawyer should render "a fair and objective evaluation," but that in 
doing so, "a lawyer does not undertake to advise the third person except 
with respect to the questions actually covered by the evaluation."s9 
Relying on such guidelines to determine the contours of a lawyer's duty 
to third parties may be workable in the case of the formal opinion letters 
discussed in section 152. Opinion letters constitute a statement of legal 
findings provided by an attorney on behalf of his client providing specific 
assurances to a third party contemplating entering into a business arrange-
ment with the client.90 Typically, the parties involved agree on parameters 
as to the scope of the opinion in advance. Moreover, an intricate set of 
professional rules has developed to govern these cases.91 If section 73(2) 
pertained only to opinion letters then much of its ambiguity would be 
resolved, for almost by definition, opinion letters fall within the "intent to 
induce" standard of current case law. 
Here again, the comments accompanying section 73 create an impres-
sion at odds with the actual text. Comment e makes consistent references 
throughout the comment to "opinion letters" in its examples of ways in 
which reliance duties may occur.92 In addition, almost all of the illustrative 
cases cited in the reporter's note to comment e also involved opinion let-
88. See id. (citing sec. 152, crnt. c). 
89. Id. at sec. 152, crnt. c. Cf Geaslen v. Berkson, Gorov and Levin, Ltd., 200 TIl. App. 3d. 
600,609-10,581 N.E.2d 138 (1991) (stating same rule). 
90. See generally James Fuld, Lawyers' Standards and Responsibilities in Rendering Opinions, 
33 Bus. LAW. 1295 (1978). 
91. See, e.g., Committee on Legal Opinions, Third-Party Legal Opinion Report, Including the 
Legal Opinion Account o/the Section o/Business Law o/the American Bar Ass'n, 47 Bus. LAW. 183 
(1991). 
92. See RESTATEMENT sec. 73, crnt. e and Reporter's Note. At the ALI proceedings last 
year, Prof. Leubsdorf similarly characterized part two as "basically the opinion letter situa-
tion." See Proceedings of the 74th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, p. 310 
(1998). 
HeinOnline -- 34 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1135 1998-1999
Attorney Liability to Nonclients 1135 
ters.93 Yet, nowhere do the Restatement comments explicitly limit the scope 
of section 73(2) to formal opinion letters or their functional equivalents.94 
Moreover, the plain language of the text itself makes no distinctions as to 
the type of opinions to which it applies. It only requires that an attorney 
invite reliance on his opinion, any opinion, in any context. 
In this expanded universe of opinions, the guidelines derived from sec-
tion 152 become problematic. "What does it mean to say that an opinion 
must be "fair and objective" when it might be relied on by an unknown 
and unintended audience in a different context than it was issued? "Who 
decides what the scope of the opinion actually covers? From whose vantage 
point should its content be analyzed and under what time frame? We saw 
in Petrillo that applying concepts like "objective purpose" is fraught with 
peril given a convoluted and ambiguous set of facts. How can a practicing 
attorney who lacks the omniscient view of the courts, not to mention the 
benefit of hindsight, possibly make sense of his or her obligations under 
these standards? 
These ambiguities reflect the conceptual tensions derived from import-
ing negligent misrepresentation analysis into malpractice law. This diffi-
culty is by no means unique to the Restatement. Courts commonly assume 
that the two causes of action are identica1.95 For most opinion liability cases, 
the results may indeed prove synonymous. However, given the expanded 
"foreseeable reliance" standard of liability imposed by the Restatement, 
problems at the margin become accentuated. 
A further point of uncertainty in part two concerns the nature of the 
third-party reliance required in order to trigger an obligation. The text 
provides only that, following an invitation, "the nonclient so relies."96 
Comment e, however, indicates that the reliance should be reasonable.97 
One can assume that an objective standard of reasonableness is invoked.98 
However, this sets up an additional theoretical dilemma in that the frames 
of reference by which the reasonableness and foreseeability of reliance are 
judged might prove partially incompatible.99 
93. The handful of cases cited in the reporter's note that do address opinions issued in less 
formalized contexts nonetheless all involved instances where reliance was intended by the 
issuer of the opinion. See Courtney, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1434; Security, 311 A.2d at 833; Capital 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Core, 343 So. 2d 284 (La. Ct. App. 1977). 
94. Cf Fineman, supra note 1, at 756-60 (drawing distinction between the clear duty 
created by issuing an opinion letter and the more tenuous obligation for other less formal 
representations made to third parties). 
95. See Greycas, 826 F.2d at 1563-64. 
96. RESTATEMENT sec. 73(2)(a). 
97. See id. at cmt. e. 
98. This is at least the more optimistic reading. 
99. Although the invitation to rely is to be judged "objectively" according to its foreseeable 
effects and the reasonableness of the third-party reliance is similarly "objectively" viewed, 
there remains a theoretical discontinuity based on the positional asymmetries between the 
HeinOnline -- 34 Tort & Ins. L.J. 1136 1998-1999
1136 Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Volume 34, Number 4, Summer 1999 
B. Provision of Services 
The problematic aspects of imposing liability for opinions under part two 
are largely duplicated in the context of provision of services. Since the 
Restatement does not define "other legal services" as used in part two, one 
can assume the phrase serves as a catchall encompassing most anything a 
lawyer does qua lawyer. 1oo As such, the same questions arise as to what 
constitutes an invitation and what duties become implicated upon accep-
tance through reliance. The Restatement comments here offer little guid-
ance in this respect, noting only that "the analysis is similar" to the case of 
opinions. 101 
Yet, when one deals with malpractice liability in the context of services, 
the analogy to negligent misrepresentation actions-already tenuous with 
respect to opinions lO2-breaks down entirely.103 This makes the nature of 
the duty owed even less clear-cut. In simple cases involving technical un-
dertakings such as registering a title, the duty of care might be objectively 
defined. 104 Such tasks resemble opinion letters in that the expectations are 
clear for everyone. In more complex transactions, the roles played by the 
various parties and their respective counsel may become nebulous. As one 
court observed: "It is not unusual for the attorney representing one party 
to prepare the instruments which are to be signed by all parties. " 105 Does 
such conduct invite reliance? If so, how does one define the "fair and ob-
jective" parameters of the duty created when one party relies on another's 
lawyer to protect the first's interests? 106 
Imposing a duty of competence defined solely by third-party expecta-
tions might commit the lawyer to pursue actions incompatible with client 
relevant actors. What is foreseeable as considered from a lawyer's viewpoint may differ from 
the response that can be predicted for a particular audience, especially when that audience is 
not identified in advance. Again, whose viewpoint controls? 
100. Indeed, even this definition may be too narrow. Comment e plainly contemplates that 
a lawyer might also be liable for nonlegal services. See RESTATEMENT, sec. 73, cmt. e ("When 
a non-client is invited to rely on a lawyer's nonlegal services, the lawyer's duty of care is 
determined by the law applicable to providers of the services in question."). But see Petrillo, 
139 N.J. at 493 (Garibaldi, ]., dissenting) (arguing that Restatement rule should not apply to 
nonlegal services such as copying a soil engineering report). 
101. See RESTATEMENT, sec. 73, cmt. e. 
102. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text. 
103. This follows from the obvious fact that services, involving conduct, not communi-
cation, cannot misrepresent anything; they are either done, or not done, with respect to a 
standard of care. 
104. Cf Simmerson, 149 Ga. App. at 479-80. 
105. Bergman v. New England Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 672, 675 (5th Cir. 1989). 
106. The danger here far exceeds that present in the opinion context because the alleged 
service commitments are likely to not be defined in writing and to be far more open-ended 
and proactive. Under the Petrillo approach, by inferring tacit understandings from circum-
stantial evidence to arrive at an "objective" reading of foreseeable reliance, the scope of the 
duty owed could be limited only by a plaintiff lawyer's imagination. 
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interests. Yet, the Restatement provisions offer little assurance that lawyers 
do not unwittingly "invite" just such a conflicting obligation. Moreover, 
the fact that a single standard governs third-party reliance as to both ser-
vices and opinions allows the analytic boundaries between the subject mat-
ter to become further blurred.107 
One additional point of uncertainty is whether an attorney's invitation 
to rely on her services needs to be offered directly to a potential claimant. 
Current case law on gratuitous undertakings-the main doctrinal vehicle 
for recognizing service liability-suggests such a limiting requirement. lOS 
All of the illustrative service cases cited in the reporter's note involve in-
stances where the attorney had dealt directly with the third party claiming 
the reliance. 109 Nothing in the text or comments of section 73, however, 
restricts application of the rule to situations of direct dealings. To omit this 
requirement forfeits an important doctrinal protection against conflict of 
interests. 110 
C. Adverse Parties 
Courts considering attorney liability to nonclients have been unanimous 
in denying claims brought by opponents in litigation. lll The potential for 
interest conflicts is simply too great. I 12 Although part two makes no special 
provisions in this regard, the Restatement does address the issue in a general 
comment applicable to the entire section. Comment c states categorically 
that "[a] lawyer representing a party in litigation has no duty of care to the 
opposing party .... "113 However, it crafts an exception to this rule for "un-
usual situations such as when a litigant is provided an opinion letter from 
opposing counsel as part of a settlement."114 
Such an exception makes intuitive sense if limited to formal opinion 
letters. There is a value to encouraging settlements, and if an opinion by 
counsel warranting certain legal findings will facilitate that process, then 
107. A lawyer's offer to perform a stated service for a nonclient might be interpreted as 
voicing an opinion that such a service constitutes an appropriate solution to the nonclient's 
needs. Conversely, a lawyer stating an opinion to a nonclient recommending that certain legal 
measures be undertaken might be deemed to have invited the nonclient to rely on the lawyer 
to provide those services. 
108. See MALPRACTICE sec. 7.3. 
109. See cases cited in RESTATEMENT sec. 73, Reporter's Note, Cffit. e. 
110. This safeguard is of special importance in the services realm because-unlike opin-
ions-gratuitous undertaking liability is not always premised on a lawyer acting to further 
her client's interest. Typically, the lawyer offers to perform a service for the third party as a 
courtesy. A rule of direct dealings ensures that the lawyer controls the understanding of the 
service being offered, in order to preclude potential conflicts. 
111. See MALPRACTICE sec. 7.10-.11. 
112. See id. 
113. RESTATEMENT sec. 73, cmt. c. 
114. [d. 
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why not? As discussed, opinion letters represent a controlled "objective" 
context in which conflicts can be minimized. The problem comes if the 
exception for "unusual situations" is permitted any wider latitude. Because 
the pursuit of settlement negotiations at all stages of litigation is so com-
mon today, representations made in a strictly litigation context might then 
be characterized as "settlement opinions" and thus made actionable via this 
loophole. The reporter's note accompanying comment c cites no cases 
supporting its view. ll5 Accordingly, any legal development in this area 
should be made with the greatest caution.1l6 
The notion of adverse interests precluding liability has been widely ap-
plied in nonlitigation contexts as well. ll7 Many courts hold that parties 
involved in arm's length transactions are barred from bringing third-party 
claims against the opposing counsel. I18 Comment c plays lip service to this 
rule, duly restating it, then appending the qualifier "except in the excep-
tional circumstances described in this Section."1l9 Since liability to third 
parties in any context can only be incurred via "this Section," the exception 
appears to swallow up the rule entirely. 
III. PROCEDURE, POLICY, AND PROPHYLAXES 
A. Procedural Protections 
The comments accompanying section 73(2) offer some procedural protec-
tion against the otherwise untrammeled obligations that part two estab-
lishes. Comment e states that a "lawyer may avoid liability to nonclients 
... by making clear that an opinion or representation is directed only to a 
client and should not be relied on by others."120 Further limiting or dis-
clainiing language can restrict liability as to contents.121 However, once 
again this comfort proves misplaced as the comment proceeds to erode the 
protection such disclaimers offer by stating that their "effectiveness ... 
depends on whether it was reasonable in the circumstances to conclude 
that those provided the opinion would receive the limitation or disclaimer 
and understand its import."122 In other words, reliance by a suitably be-
fuddled plaintiff can trump any disclaimer. 
llS. See cases cited in id., reporter's note, cmt. c. 
116. Cf MALPRACTICE sec. 7.11 ("Although the particular activity in question may not be 
adverse, and may actually be beneficial, the appropriate inquiry concerns the purpose of the 
entire representation. H). 
II 7. See MALPRACTICE sec. 7.11. 
llS. See id. 
119. See RESTATEMENT sec. 73, cmt. c. 
120. RESTATEMENT sec. 73, cmt. e. 
121. See id. 
122. ld. "The relevant circumstances include customary practices known to the recipient 
concerning the construction of opinions, and whether the recipient is represented by counsel 
or a similarly experienced agent." Id. 
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Even if judges were to attempt to give such disclaimers more force by 
interpreting the exception narrowly, the procedural safeguard remains im-
perfect. In a large corporate law firm, many such disclaimers will likely be 
reduced to standardized boilerplate language that almost any plaintiff could 
reasonably disregard. Moreover, given that reliance on opinions or services 
under part two is not restricted to invitations made in writing, the oppor-
tunity to append a disclaimer may be limited as a practical matter. A similar 
difficulty may arise when the client issues the invitation (with the attorney's 
acquiescence). 123 
On the other hand, in certain situations, disclaimers are independently 
required as a matter of professional ethics. Examples where such obliga-
tions arise include entity representation124 or dealings with unrepresented 
parties. 125 In these cases, the provision or omission of appropriate warnings 
arguably should be explicitly factored into a determination of third-party 
liability. Section 73 makes no such differentiation. 
B. Policy Concerns 
The comments accompanying section 73 offer little by way of justification 
for the rather drastic standard of liability that the section imposes. Com-
ment b, entitled "Rationale," makes only the bland statement that non-
clients "will foreseeably be harmed by inappropriate acts of the lawyers[, 
and h]olding lawyers liable for such harm is sometimes warranted." To 
begin with, one should note that "inappropriate" is used here in conclusory 
fashion. The liability under section 73 is not premised on fraud or any 
other intentional, unethical conduct. Therefore, the inappropriate acts to 
which this argument refers entail, at most, instances of negligence. 
In determining the consequences of a lawyer's action that harms non-
clients, the default position must be that liability is generally not warranted 
for mere negligence. Absent some special circumstance, lawyers-just like 
any other citizen-owe no duty of care to strangers. The special circum-
stance that section 73(2) contemplates involves reliance. Yet, reliance flows 
from the victim, not the alleged tortfeasor, so why should this count? The 
123. One commentator takes a different approach suggesting that a rule that would limit 
an attorney's exposure to third parties be based on the attorney's documentation of discussions 
addressing third-party issues with the client. See Nancy Lewis, Lawyers' Liability to Third 
Parties: The Ideology of Advocacy Reframed, 66 OR. L. REv. 801, 833-36 (1987). The idea would 
be that the client's infonned consent would transfer third-party liability from attorney to 
client. At least one court has recognized the availability of redress elsewhere as a factor in 
detennining whether to sustain liability by the attorney. See Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 
835,843-44,872 P.2d 1080, 1084-85 (1994). However, as a practical matter, allowing liability 
to hinge procedurally on such documentation would seem both unduly onerous for consci-
entious attorneys and subject to manipulation by unscrupulous ones. 
124. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule l.13(d). 
125. See id. Rule 4.3; accord RESTATEMENT sec. 163 (governing dealings with unrepresented 
parties). 
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key to part two is that the lawyer invite reliance. This voluntary action by 
the lawyer both creates and legitimates an expanded civil obligation, i.e., 
the duty to avoid inflicting negligent harm. 
Under a foreseeable reliance standard, however, the lawyer's "invitation" 
need not be deliberate. The lawyer assumes an affirmative duty to antici-
pate reliance and take appropriate precautions. In essence, this creates a 
duty to anticipate a duty. Failure to do so constitutes a kind of meta-
negligence. 
What justifies this rather extraordinary expansion of traditional princi-
ples of tort liability? The discussion in the literature of the rationale behind 
third-party liability pulls out the usual chestnuts that appear to justify any 
expansion of malpractice liability: the fact that attorneys are better situated 
to absorb the risk professionally and financially;126 the moral imperative of 
favoring an innocent nonclient over a negligent attorney; and the desira-
bility of incentives to improve the standards of practice in the profession.127 
One commentator also suggests that forcing attorneys to consider third-
party interests will make the practice of law more ethical and less adver-
sarial, thus raising the profession's image in society.128 
All of these concerns can be opposed by equally compelling counterar-
guments. The presence of malpractice insurance acts as a buffer cushioning 
attorneys from direct pressure to improve their quality of practice. 129 Par-
ticularly in a case such as section 73, where indeterminate liability and 
conflicting obligations place attorneys in a no-win situation, attorneys 
might just pass on the added costs to their clients and to the general 
public. l3O Nonclients may actually suffer a reduced quality of services in 
the form of highly equivocal opinions laden with caveats and qualifiers. 13l 
Furthermore, encouraging nonclients to rely on an opposing attorney 
might reduce their incentive to seek the benefit of their own counsel.132 
As for improving the profession's image, section 73(2) does not apply to 
litigation, the primary adversarial arena on which the public image oflaw-
yers hinges. Moreover, as a general matter, the wisdom of relying on tort 
law as an instrument to achieve social change is questionable. Studies have 
shown that the enforcement of tort liability is highly erratic133 and have 
126. See Eisenberg, supra note 43, at 127-31. 
127. See Lewis, supra note 125, at 832-36. 
128. See id. at 832-33. 
129. See Cifu, supra note 6, at 23. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. at 24. 
132. See Bell v. Manning, 613 S.W.2d 335,339 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) 
133. See, e.g., Michael]. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort 
Litigation System-and Why Not?, 140 PA. L. REv. 1147 (1992) (showing that only a very small 
fraction of people with meritorious claims bother to enforce them). 
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suggested that it has only marginal systemic effects and that its costs far 
exceed the benefits. 134 
However, the most fundamental objection to expanding liability to third 
parties is the troubling implications that such a policy holds for the attor-
ney-client relationship. Court after court have held that in cases where the 
possibility of conflicts arises, obligations to third parties must yield to the 
higher priority that society places on an attorney's paramount duties to her 
client.135 As the California Supreme Court stated over two decades ago: 
Recognizing a liberal duty to third parties would inject undesirable self-pro-
tective reservations into the attorney's counselling role. The attorney's pre-
occupation or concern with the possibility of claims based on mere negligence 
... by any with whom his client might deal "would prevent him from devoting 
his entire energies to his client's interests .... The result would be "an undue 
burden on the profession" ... and a diminution in the quality of the legal 
services received by the client.1l6 
That court recently reiterated its uncompromising stance toward uphold-
ing the undivided loyalty an attorney owes to his client as against third-
party interlopers, albeit in a slightly different context. 137 Other jurisdictions 
have echoed their agreement. 138 In addition to ensuring loyalty and zeal-
ousness by attorneys, serious issues as to client confidentiality hang in the 
balance. 139 
The strong public policy interest in protecting these fundamental values 
of legal representation from conflicts clearly trump concerns over third-
party reliance. Any enforcement mechanism to protect the latter, therefore, 
should err on the side of underenforcement whenever potential conflicts 
surface. l40 Although the Restatement comments acknowledge this risk, nei-
134. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, DoingAway with TortLaw, 73 Cu. L. REv. 558 (1985). 
135. Cf supra quotation accompanying note 10. 
136. Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335,134 Cal. Rptr. 375, 556 P.2d 737 (1976) (in-
ternal citations omitted); accord Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal. App. 3d 954, 961-62, 226 Cal. Rptr. 
532 (1986) ("strong public policy in maintaining and enforcing the fidelity and duty of the 
attorney toward the client militates against the imposition of a duty to nonclients .... "). See 
also Cifu, supra note 6, at 19 ("If a duty of care were owed to nonclient third parties, an 
attorney concerned with his or her own personal liability might, despite the unethical nature 
of the advice, counsel a client not to proceed with a difficult or unique transaction, out of 
fear of potential liability to third parties. Similarly, an attorney may understandibly be tempted 
to insert a choice of law clause into a contract between the client and a third party selecting 
the law of New York or another privity state [solely] out of concern for his or her own potential 
liability .... "). 
137. See Flatt v. Superior Ct., 9 Cal. 4th 275, 290, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 885 P.2d 950 
(1994). 
138. See, e.g., Logotheti v. Gordon, 414 Mass. 308, 311-12, 607 N.E.2d 1015 (1993); 
Crossland, 700 F. Supp. at 1282-83. 
139. See MALPRACTICE sec. 7.11-.12. 
140. An analogy might be made to the "actual malice" standard applicable to libel of public 
figures. The Supreme Court here deliberately imposed a higher bar on liability than would 
otherwise be wartanted in order to preserve a buffer against the possibility that overenforce-
ment might chill public debate. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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ther the text nor comments of part two offer specific doctrinal mechanisms 
to control it. The attorney-client relationship is simply too important to 
risk experimenting upon with the untested and overly broad standards of 
section 73(2). 
One could, of course, make the argument that the current model of 
attorney-client relations itself has outlived its usefulness and needs to be 
reconsidered. Its essential bipolar premises derive from litigation; yet, now-
adays lawyers increasingly playa counseling role that emphasizes bridge 
building between different constituencies in which the old labels of friend 
versus foe no longer apply. Moreover, just as corporations face growing 
pressure to look beyond the short-term dictates of shareholder values and 
embrace broader community values, so too lawyers have been charged with 
a higher responsibility than single-minded devotion to client welfare.141 
There is nothing wrong with having this debate. Many of the principal 
authors behind the Restatement are respected academics who have taken 
scholarly positions in favor of a broader conception of the attorney's role. 142 
However, the debate should be conducted openly, and changes to existing 
law-if any-need to be clearly mapped out and enacted in comprehensive 
fashion. By any of these criteria, section 73(2) represents an unwelcome 
development. 
To be sure, a lawyer's interactions with third parties constitute an im-
portant facet of any reconceptualized "broader role" for lawyers to play. 
Yet, it is only one piece of a larger puzzle. Expanding the scope of third-
party liability makes lawyers accountable for new duties without modifying 
the old ones to compensate. Such piecemeal tinkering with standards of 
professional responsibility threatens to discredit the project of reform. 
Even in the best case, tort law is a rather blunt instrument for engi-
neering social change. The text and comments of section 73(2) do little to 
ensure precision. Adopting a single umbrella formulation to unify the di-
vergent strands of existing case law has resulted in overly broad language 
that aims indiscriminately at uncertain targets. The supporting commen-
tary serves to obscure the effects of this untested language, giving the 
141. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083 
(1988) (arguing that lawyers should seek to "do justice" instead of merely opportunistically 
advancing client interests). 
142. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. 
REv. 825 (1992); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quarter: An 
Extended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1041 (1997); Hazard, Triangular Lawyer Relations: An 
Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987). As mentioned, Prof. Leubsdorf was 
the associate reporter for the Restatement and author of its chapter on Lawyer Civil Liability. 
Prof. Hazard's only fonnal involvement with the Restatement was ex officio as director of the 
American Law Institute. However, as an authority on legal ethics, he doubtless had a hand 
in the drafting process, and he participated actively in the ALI proceedings on lawyer liability. 
See Proceedings of the 74th Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, pp. 310-29 (1998). 
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appearance of fidelity to existing case law, while perpetuating crucial 
ambiguities. 
Such ambiguity extends even to a pivotal term of the text itself-the 
meaning of "invited" reliance. Allowing invitations to be predicated solely 
on the basis of foreseeability would hold lawyers to an unprecendented 
standard of metanegligence. Equally troubling is the confusion over the 
standard of care that would be required. Read broadly, section 73(2) affords 
third-party nonclients a duty of care defined by the same legal standards 
of malpractice as that owed to clients-effectively transforming third par-
ties into quasi-clients. The Restatement attempts to cabin such quasi-rela-
tionships through contextual constraints based on a highly tendentious no-
tion of "objective purpose." Yet, the genie once let out of the bottle will 
not be so easily contained. 
The predilection of the principal Restatement authors for dabbling in 
quasi-client metaphysics has been commented upon already in other con-
texts. 143 Manipulating such theoretical abstractions might make the stuff of 
fine law review articles; however, it has no place as a substantive standard 
to govern professional decisions made in the rough and tumble world in 
which law is practiced today. There is a virtue in certainty-a virtue of 
which the current draft Restatement proves alarmingly deficient. 
C. Prophylactic Rx: Limiting the Damage by Judicial Construction 
Some might object to the preceding analysis as overly alarmist. After all, 
just because New Jersey and Mississippi courts have adopted a foreseeable 
reliance standard does not mean that others will follow. The text of the 
Restatement is still amenable to a narrower construction, reading "invite" 
in line with the established "intent to induce" test. One could likewise take 
the commentary that follows at face value to impose limitations on the 
text-in essence, ignoring the adverbs such as "typically" or "ordinarily" 
that preserve loopholes. Additional safeguards could also be incorporated 
from preexisting common law. For example, courts should decline to per-
mit liability whenever the possibility of a conflict of interests arises. 
A further innovation that courts might pursue would be to eschew the 
one-size-fits-all approach that section 73(2) introduces and to develop doc-
trinal distinctions between types of third-party reliance that deserve dif-
ferent treatment. For example, attorneys should owe a higher protective 
duty when they know they are dealing with a nonclient who is without the 
benefit of counsel. Similarly, family relations of clients should merit greater 
consideration than business partners in arm's length negotiations. 
The context in which the reliance occurred might also factor into the 
nature of the duty that results. In cases such as an opinion letter, where 
143. See Silver & Quinn, supra note 11, at 22. 
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the attorney, acting in furtherance of the client's interest, deliberately offers 
counsel to nonclient beneficiaries, the broad duties of care defined by pro-
fessional negligence standards could be implicated. In other cases, absent 
privity, the attorney's duty would be limited to a warranty against negligent 
misrepresentation. l44 With respect to services, malpractice liability for gra-
tuitous undertakings should extend only to discrete tasks whose satisfactory 
completion can be objectively appraised, or, alternately, would rest on the 
creation of an independent attorney-client relationship with the third 
party. 145 
With a combination of limiting constructions and common law accre-
tions, section 73(2) may thus prove workable after all. But such a solution 
is hardly foreordained. The courts of Mississippi and New Jersey have 
pointed the way down a slippery slope. The bar and the judiciary elsewhere 
need to be alert to the dangers. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In sum, section 73(2) threatens an unwelcome inflation of existing liability 
standards for third-party reliance. Its stripped-down formula and untested 
language bear the hallmarks of a document grounded more in academic 
theory than common sense. Despite the reassurances by the comments that 
accompany it, the Restatement offers plaintiffs' attorneys a plethora ofloop-
holes by which to bring lawsuits under innovative theories. At best, these 
ambiguities will open the door to much unneeded litigation. At worst, 
attorneys will face the specter of indeterminate liability and unavoidable 
conflicts. Instead of restating the law, part two of section 73 in fact rep-
resents an alarming departure. It is the drafters of this Restatement who 
have misstated the law, but innocent attorneys will suffer the consequences. 
144. For cases on the other extreme, where the lawyer offers a gratuitous opinion in cir-
cumstances demonstrating the absence of any client interests, a full-blooded malpractice stan-
dard of care could, of course, be safely imposed without prejudice to client interests. Such 
liability lies outside the scope of section 73, however. See RESTATEMENT, sec. 73, cmt. a (cross-
referencing section 42). 
145. Gratuitous undertaking theory had its origins at a time when attorney-client rela-
tionships could only form under classical contract conditions of offer and acceptance. Yet 
today, the Restatement's own low threshold for recognizing attorney-client relationships seems 
to undercut the whole logic for retaining broad, yet ambiguous standards of care owed to 
"quasi-clients." Why allow a robust standard of liability to nonclients based on section 73(2) 
reliance when, under slightly different conditions, reliance can give rise to a full-blooded 
attorney-client relationship? See RESTATEMENT sec. 26 (stating that attorney-client relation-
ship can form when "a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide 
legal services ... and ... the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person rea-
sonably relies on the lawyer to provide services"). Cf Moore, supra note 8, at 698-701 (sug-
gesting that rather than stretch third-patty doctrines to encompass ambiguous situations, a 
more acceptable solution would be simply to recognize a full-fledged attorney-client rela-
tionship, allowing practitioners the certainty of knowing where they stand). 
